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A fiduciary relationship is created when a person undertakes (commits or 
agrees) to perform a representative function on behalf of another person or in 
relation to a specified purpose, and when the fiduciary is empowered (provided 
with the legal authority) to perform that function.  Recent case law has 
foregrounded these elemental components of fiduciary relationships.  For 
example, in Halton International Inc (Holding) Sarl v Guernroy Ltd Paton J, as he 
then was, observed that: 
“A critical and usually determinative feature of any fiduciary relationship is the 
agreement of the fiduciary to act in the interests of the principal in the exercise of the power 
which is granted or in relation to the principal's property or business affairs.”1 
More recently, in Nehayan v Kent, Leggatt J, as he then was, observed, “fiduciary 
duties typically arise where one person undertakes and is entrusted with authority 
to manage the property or affairs of another and to make discretionary 
decisions on behalf of that person”.2  
The core duty of the fiduciary is to perform the undertaking, the 
performance of which is the reason for the existence of the relationship. The 
                                                          
* I am very grateful for comments on earlier versions of the article from Matthew Conaglen, 
Tatiana Cutts, Leslie Kosmin, Simon Witney and the anonymous reviewer of the article.  
1 [2005] EWHC 1968 (Ch) at [148] (emphasis supplied). 
2 [2018] EWHC 333 (emphasis supplied). In reaching these conclusions, both Patten J and 
Leggatt J drew upon the High Court of Australia’s judgment  in Hospital Products Ltd v United 
States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41, 96-97. The debate about the conditions pursuant to 
which fiduciary obligations are created is far more extensive and contentious than I have the 
space to address here (see for example: E.J. Weinrib, ‘The Fiduciary Obligation’ (1975) 25 
University of Toronto Law Journal 1; J. Edelman, ‘When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise’ (2010) 126 
L.Q.R 302; L. Smith, ‘Contract and Consent and Fiduciary Relationships’ in P. Miller and A. 
Gold, eds Contract, Status and Fiduciary Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); and P. 




foundational questions in any fiduciary context are, therefore: what did the 
fiduciary undertake to do and what was she empowered to do?  Consider in 
this regard, for example, the trusts case of Boardman v Phipps,3 which involved 
an action brought against agent-fiduciaries of a trust who took a business 
opportunity which arose in connection with shares held by the trust. Lord 
Upjohn observed that the starting point was an examination of the relationship 
“to see what duties are thereby imposed on the [fiduciary], to see what is the 
scope and ambit of the duty imposed upon him”.4  The “duty” he was referring 
to here was the scope and ambit of the undertaking that the fiduciary-agents 
had agreed, and that the trustees had empowered them, to perform.  
The performance of this core undertaking or duty is regulated by what 
is referred to in this article as the general duties—the fiduciary duties5 to act in 
good faith in the performance of the undertaking and to avoid a conflict of 
undertaken duty and personal interest, and the duty of care. The general duties, 
as Matthew Conaglen6  has observed, are second order obligations which serve 
the effective performance of this core duty;7 they are only meaningful through 
their interaction with the first-order undertaking—a fiduciary who undertakes to 
exercise delegated power for a specified purpose is required to exercise the 
delegated power in good faith to further that purpose; the fiduciary must take 
due care when exercising the delegated authority; and when performing the 
undertaking the fiduciary may not place himself in a position where he has a 
conflicting personal financial interest with the performance of the undertaking.  
Real and legal persons can give and perform multiple and distinct 
fiduciary undertakings. That is, one person can have multiple fiduciary 
personas. A person can, for example, undertake and be empowered to act as 
trustee, agent, solicitor, and guardian for the same person who is beneficiary, 
principal, client, and child.  The creation of each fiduciary persona is a function 
of the above elemental conditions: a specific undertaking and the 
empowerment to perform that undertaking.  Each such undertaking is separate 
and each is, separately, subject to the general duties.  These undertakings 
cannot be merged into one by choosing one of the fiduciary relationships—
                                                          
3 [1967] 2 AC 46. 
4 [1967] 2 AC 46 at 127. 
5 This article does not engage with the debates about which duties are fiduciary duties.  
6 M. Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) at 61-61 and 32-34. 
7 This representation distorts somewhat Conaglen’s position, which is that the function of 
“peculiarly fiduciary duties” is to provide an “enhanced likelihood of…the proper performance 
of the fiduciary’s non-fiduciary duties”. The argument here is all of the general duties—good 




trustee, agent, guardian—as a label for all of them.   If we did so we would risk 
confusing the fiduciary’s obligations in relation to the performance of those 
distinctive undertakings. What if the trust requires only the holding and 
transfer of bank account claims to the child on a specified birthday, yet the 
agency undertaking involves a full-time undertaking to pursue all promotion 
activities related to the child-prodigy’s brand and musical activities? To merge 
all the undertakings under one fiduciary label—say the label of the agent—
would risk overspill from the broad prescriptive agency undertaking into the 
very narrow and limited trusteeship undertaking. 
 This article is concerned with corporate law’s multiple fiduciary 
personas. It argues that although corporate law is very familiar with the idea 
that one person can have several capacities in which she has a relationship with 
the company—as, for example, shareholder, creditor, employee and director—
it has lost sight of the similar and basic fiduciary insight.  It has come to treat 
all the fiduciary relationships which a person who is a director of the company 
has with the company as being subsumed by the role of director, when in fact a 
person who is a director may undertake multiple and separate fiduciary 
obligations qua, inter alia, director, senior manager or agent.8     
Corporate law’s fiduciary persona-myopia is seen most easily in relation 
to the de facto director concept. It has led some courts to assume that the only 
way an individual can be deemed to be subject to corporate fiduciary obligation 
is if she is held to be a de facto director, resulting in senior managers who do 
not perform, and are not held out as performing, any formal or informal 
directorial function being deemed to be de facto directors.  More significantly, 
however, this fiduciary persona-myopia has resulted in UK company law 
making a profound category error: it has built its modern (post-1970) 
understanding of the nature of a directors’ duties on the basis of cases that, 
properly categorised, address a different fiduciary relationship, namely senior 
managers as fiduciaries.  The directorial undertaking is a narrow, limited and 
periodically exercised one which focuses on the collective exercise of board 
power and responsibility for its exercise; whereas the managerial undertaking is 
a broad positive full-time undertaking.  The effect of this category error is the 
absorption of the prescriptive duties which rightly reflect full-time managerial 
undertakings into a “director’s duties”, applicable to all directors, thereby 
significantly expanding the obligations of directors beyond the job description 
                                                          
8 For an important and rare consideration of the importance of the tension between the 
managerial and directorial role see P. Davies and S. Worthington, Gower’s Principles of Modern 
Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 10th eds, 2016) at 475-476. 
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and the directorial undertaking. This in turn has destabilised and altered the 
no-conflicts rule as it apply to directors, radically changing the constraints 
placed upon a director’s external/extra-company business activities and 
reconfiguring the incentive structure for accepting a directorial role, rendering 
it much less attractive and thereby invoking a policy concern about deterring 
board service which courts have, since the mid-18th century, encouraged us to 
take seriously.9 The article first addresses this category error and its doctrinal 
effects before turning to de facto directors.  
 
 
II. FIDUCIARY-PERSONA AND UNDERTAKING MYOPIA  
 
1. Foregrounding Corporate Fiduciary Undertakings 
Real persons who perform governance and/or operational roles within the 
corporation may make, and be empowered to perform, several distinct and 
separate fiduciary undertakings. But modern corporate law is, as this section of 
the article will demonstrate, only capable of seeing the directorial fiduciary role.  
Although a few cases have recognised that senior managers and employees 
may be fiduciaries, when a person who performs multiple representative roles 
for a company is a director then the category of director displaces all of these 
other fiduciary roles.  
One of the drivers of corporate law’s failure to distinguish between 
different fiduciary roles performed by the same real person is the language that 
has been (and still is) deployed to describe those senior managers who are also 
directors. Today, in common corporate parlance we follow the American 
vernacular and distinguish between a director and a chief executive officer. The 
latter is typically also a director but the distinction makes it clear that there are 
two separate capacities/roles—as director and as management employee. 
However, prior to this shift in our vocabulary it was commonplace to refer to 
the CEO as the “managing director”—a term of corporate legal art that elided 
the distinction between director and employee and implied that the senior 
manager of the company had to be a director. However, the position of 
managing director is an executive not a directorial position. Article 84 of the 
                                                          
9 Knight v Earl of Plymouth Dickens 120 (1747), per Lord Hardwicke: “to add hazard or risque to 
that trouble and to subject a trustee to losses which he could not foresee, and consequently not 





Table A model articles issued pursuant to the Companies Act 1985 provided, 
for example, that “the directors may appoint one or more of their number to 
the office of managing director or to any other executive office”.  Similarly, today 
we distinguish between executive and non-executive directors; a distinction 
that underpins the UK’s modern soft-law regulation of the board through the 
Corporate Governance Code.  However, as with “managing director”, the 
notion of an “executive director” elides the distinction between executive and 
director. There is no capacity or office which is “the executive director”, there 
is only a person who is both an executive (an employee) and a director. The 
managing director or the executive director is a person who has made two 
separate fiduciary undertakings and has been subject to two separate forms of 
empowerment, just as a person could be a trustee, agent and guardian in 
relation to same real person. But the terminology of managing director and 
executive director guides us when thinking about fiduciary obligations to see 
only the noun and not the adjective.  
The notion that there are separate and distinct fiduciary personas and 
undertakings given by the same senior real persons in the corporation is not 
only supported by careful application of basic fiduciary law principles, it is 
encoded within the Companies Acts through the oft neglected concept of the 
“the office”. With its origins in public and ecclesiastical law,10 the concept of an 
“office” has long referred to the performance of a representative function. 
John Leach, later Master of the Rolls, argued before Lord Eldon in 1808 that 
“there is no public officer, from the Crown downwards, who is not in some 
sense a trustee”.11 The concept of “the office” has permeated UK corporate 
charters and codes since the inception of incorporation by charter or statutory 
registration.  The East India Company’s charter of 1600, for example, refers to 
the “office” of the Governor and Deputy-Governor12 and the term peppers 
the UK’s earliest general incorporation statutes.13 And the concept of 
corporate “officer” remains a key part of modern corporate legislation.  
Importantly, the Companies Act 2006 provides that an “officer” includes not 
only a director but also a manager or secretary, thereby importing the notion 
that a manager or a company secretary is also “in some sense a trustee”.14 In 
this regard, consider also that Table A referred to the role of managing director 
as an executive “office” and that the “summary remedy” provided by section 
                                                          
10 J.G. Allen, ‘The Office of the Crown’ (2018) 77 C.L.J. 298, 307-312. 
11 Attorney General v Brown (1818) 1 Wils Ch. 323, 357. 
12 Charter Granted by Queen Elizabeth to the East India Company, 31 December 1600. 
13 See, for example, Companies Act 1862, inter alia, ss. 42, 43, 58, 60, and 64. 
14 S. 1173 Companies Act 2006. 
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212 of the Insolvency Act 1986—a version of which has been in place since 
186215—refers to the fiduciary duties of officers. And, as a comparative aside, 
it is noteworthy that the Australian Corporation Act not only defines officer in 
a way that includes, inter alia, senior managers16 but, in contrast to the UK 
statute, explicitly makes the general duties application to both directors and 
officers.17   But note finally in this regard that through the lens of the elemental 
conditions for fiduciary relations a person is not a fiduciary because he is 
deemed to occupy the status of “officer” but because “officer” is a label for a 
person who has given a distinct representative undertaking, which may include 
a representative managerial undertaking, and has been empowered to perform 
it.   
To foreground more clearly the separate and distinct representative 
fiduciary undertakings made to a corporation, consider the following examples: 
Example A  
Jill agrees to accept the role of a director on the board of a large listed company 
(Company A).  She is not an employee or manager of the company. She does not 
agree to perform any role on any committee of the board. She is informed by the 
company prior to her appointment that there are ten half- to full-day meetings of 
the board each year and a separate two-day strategy away-day held during the 
summer months. She is informed that the expectation is that a director attends at 
least eight of the board meetings in person, but may dial into two of those 
meetings remotely.   Board meeting agendas are set by the chair of the board in 
close co-operation with the chief executive officer of the company. Board 
materials are often significant requiring one to two days of reading time.  
Jill’s undertaking is limited. She does not undertake to perform any operational or 
managerial role. She undertakes only to attend duly convened board meetings and 
at such meetings to participate in the collective exercise of board power on the 
issues brought before the duly convened board by the chair of the board.  Her 
undertaking to play a role in the collective exercise of board power extends to the 
appointment of, and the delegation of power to, senior management as well as 
being responsible for that delegation. Nor does she undertake to determine what 
issues should be brought before the board. Necessarily, in determining which 
issues are brought before the board, she must rely on the chair and senior 
managers who have a closer working knowledge of the operations of the company.  
                                                          
15 S. 165 Companies Act 1862. 
16 S.9 Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
17 S.181 Australian Corporations Act 2001. See CellOS Software Ltd v Huber [2018] FCA 2069, 
where the High Court both focused on the CEO’s duties as fiduciary, but also, consistent with 
the argument in this article, observed that the nature of his fiduciary duty was “defined by the 
scope of his engagement and responsibilities as CEO” (at [786]).  
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More formal support for understanding Jill’s undertaking in this limited board-
focused way can be found a company’s articles of association—which contain the 
company’s understanding of the directorial role which a director in accepting the 
role undertakes to perform—as well as in UK Corporate Governance Code. The 
Corporate Governance Code’s understanding of the non-executive role is 
organised around key decision-making roles (for example, appointment and 
removal,18 remuneration,19 nomination20) and the effective and inclusive exercise of 
board power.21 Prior to 2006, articles of association typically provided that “the 
business of the company shall be managed by the directors, who…may exercise all 
such powers of the company”;22 phrasing that, contrary to the above 
understanding, could be read as providing for a broader managerial undertaking by 
Jill.  Note, however, that in a UK company although power is typically delegated to 
all directors (rather than to a board),23 it can only be exercised collectively. 
Standard pre-2006 articles made clear that the business was “despatched”24 by 
directors only in board meetings, where directorial power could only be exercised 
when the meeting was quorate. Furthermore, as noted above, these articles 
provided explicitly for the “office” of managing director, to whom individual, 
rather than collective, power could be delegated. The modern Model Articles of 
Association now provide that the directors are “responsible for the management of 
the company’s business” through the collective exercise of power;25 a responsibility 
which is fulfilled by participating in the collective exercise of power on matters 
brought before the board and taking responsibility for the exercise of that power, 
which would include supervision of management. 
Example B.   
Felix also accepts a role as director of Company A but also accepts the role of 
executive chair of the board.  This is a full time, but non-operational role.  Not 
only, as in Jill’s case, is Felix’s undertaking to exercise power collectively in relation 
to the issues brought before the board, but as chair he also undertakes to work 
with management to proactively determine the board’s meeting timetable, the 
board agenda and to provide for the effective functioning of the board. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code observes in this regard that “the chair leads the board 
and is responsible for its overall effectiveness”.26  
 
                                                          
18 UK Corporate Governance Code (2018), 2.13. 
19 UK Corporate Governance Code (2018) 5.32. 
20 UK Corporate Governance Code (2018) 3.17. 
21 UK Corporate Governance Code (2018) 1.5. 
22 Table A Articles issues pursuant to the Companies Act 1948. 
23 Art. 3 Model Articles for Public or Private Companies.  
24 Table A Articles pursuant to the Companies Act 1862 (art. 66); Companies Act 1929 (art. 
81); Companies Act 1948  
25 See Articles 3 and 7 Model Articles for Public Companies.  
26 UK Corporate Governance Code, Principle F. 
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Example C  
Jill (from Example A), although she is not a manager and has no employment 
contract with the company, is informed at a board meeting that a new opportunity 
in the company’s area of business has presented itself, however, senior 
management does not have the time to pursue it. Jill offers to take steps to acquire 
the opportunity on the company’s behalf. The board expresses their gratitude for 
her efforts and looks forward to hearing from her on this, thereby empowering her 
to perform the role.  Jill here does not alter her directorial undertaking rather she 
makes an additional fiduciary undertaking, just as a person who is already a trustee 
makes an additional fiduciary undertaking when she agrees to act as a beneficiary’s 
agent. She becomes a fiduciary-agent in relation to this discrete project. These 
fiduciary roles are connected through the corporate principal, but are distinct.  
Example D.  
Sara agrees to accept the role of director and CEO of Company A.  Like Jill, she 
undertakes to exercise power delegated to her collectively with the other directors 
on the issues that the board is asked to consider. She also undertakes to exercise 
the power and authority delegated to her to operationally manage and run the 
company. This undertaking involves a full-time work commitment and an 
undertaking to proactively deploy and delegate corporate power to further the 
company’s business and purpose, and to report to the board on the performance 
and operation of the company.  Sara makes two separate fiduciary undertakings 
and they are as distinct as her two roles. Her undertaking as a director is identical 
to Jill’s. Her second fiduciary undertaking is an undertaking in a separate capacity, 
as a managerial agent of the company. 
Example E.  
The nature of this board-power undertaking is easier to see in a listed company 
with a director who performs no managerial role such as Jill, and the separate 
duties owed by Sara are easier to see when her directorial role is juxtaposed next to 
Jill’s. But this same directorial undertaking and the separate managerial undertaking 
also apply at the opposite end of the corporate spectrum, to a director-manager in 
a small one-person company. A director-manager of such a one-person company 
does not act as a director when he signs a contract or decides to build a new 
product; in such circumstances he acts as a manager or as an agent with general or 
specific power delegated to him, as manager or agent, by him as director.  Placing 
the regulation of informal meetings to one side, he acts a director only when a 
board meeting is called and a decision is made in that meeting to exercise board 
power. Like Jill, his directorial undertaking relates to and is necessarily only 
performed in such board meetings.  
These examples offer two lessons. First, there is a specific directorial 
undertaking that applies to all directors (whether or not a person who is a 
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director makes any additional undertakings) and is limited to the collective 
exercise and delegation of power. Of course the directorial undertaking may 
vary depending on the nature of the board role—the chair of the board, or the 
chair of a committee of the board makes an additional and distinctive directorial 
undertaking. Second, an individual person who is a director may undertake to 
perform, and be empowered to perform, different representative tasks for the 
company, including proactive positive functions, however, these fiduciary 
undertakings are separate from the directorial undertaking. We might attempt 
to categorize or label such undertakings as managerial undertakings, task-
specific agency undertakings, or even quasi-partnership undertakings, although, 
any such categorizations are to some degree inaccurate as the nature of the 
undertaking is always role and circumstance specific.  
 
2. Excavating Managerial Undertakings from Directors’ Duties 
In Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley,27 one of the most influential 
cases in the UK’s modern law on directors’ duties,28 the High Court was asked 
to consider whether a former managing director had to account for profits that 
he had made from a contract for architectural services which the company had 
actively pursed, but failed to obtain, whilst the defendant was the company’s 
managing director. The Court did not distinguish between director and 
managing director and indeed at times suggests that the duties of both are 
identical. “The right approach”, Roskill J held, “is first to consider the duty 
which a director (including a managing director) owes to the company of 
which he is a director”.29  However, in considering the facts and the 
defendant’s actions, the court had no regard to the role of the defendant as a 
member of the board of directors, or to the exercise of board power, but 
focused exclusively on the defendant’s executive role as managing director.  In 
reaching its conclusion that the defendant had a “duty to pass on” information 
to the company about the opportunity, the court observed that: 
“The defendant had one capacity and one capacity only in which he was carrying 
on business at that time. That capacity was as managing director of the plaintiffs. 
Information which came to him while he was managing director and which was of 
concern to the plaintiffs and was relevant for the plaintiffs to know, was 
information which it was his duty to pass on to the plaintiffs because between 
himself and the plaintiffs a fiduciary relation existed... 
                                                          
27 [1972] 2 ALL ER 162. 
28 For example: Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] 2 BCLC 241 relying on IDC. 
29 [1972] 2 ALL ER 162 at 171. 
10 
 
It seems to me plain that throughout the whole of May, June and July 1969 the 
defendant was in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiffs. From the time he 
embarked on his course of dealing…which put his personal interest…in direct 
conflict with his pre-existing and continuing duty as managing director of the 
plaintiffs.”30 
The nature of the defendant’s duty identified in IDC—a proactive obligation to 
pass on information—was the product of the nature of his fiduciary 
undertaking as a manager not as a director. As a full-time senior manager of 
the company, Cooley undertook to use the corporate power and authority 
delegated to him to proactively further the interests of the company in relevant 
business opportunities;31 an expansive, prescriptive undertaking very similar to 
that made by an active partner who has a positive duty to engage in business 
and to seek opportunities within the scope of the partnership.32 Indeed, this is 
how some subsequent cases have interpreted the case. In University of 
Nottingham v Fischel,33 for example, the court observed that: “the important 
feature of Cooley’s case, which is clearly implicit in this judgment, is that the 
defendant had a specific duty to secure contracts of this nature”.34 
IDC is potentially misleading as it can be read as treating the managing 
director undertaking as synonymous with the directorial undertaking. It is not 
correct that the “defendant had one capacity and one capacity only”; rather he 
had two fiduciary capacities—as director and managing director/CEO. 
However, if we read this sentence carefully we can see that in relation to the 
facts of this case—“in which he was carrying on business at that time”35—he did 
have one capacity and it was as managing director of the company with a 
specific positive duty to acquire contracts of this nature.  His fiduciary role as a 
director of the company was not in play on these facts as the board was not 
required to consider an exercise of corporate power.  IDC is, therefore, an 
authority in relation to the fiduciary obligations of senior managers, not, as it is 
generally understood, in relation to the fiduciary obligations of directors. 
Subsequent case law, most importantly the Court of Appeal’s decision in Item 
Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi,36 has relied on IDC to support the position that 
directors owe a duty of disclosure related to their own wrongdoing or breach 
                                                          
30 [1972] 2 ALL ER 162 at 174 (emphasis supplied). 
31 The demarcation of those company interests raises difficult questions which are not 
addressed in this article. See further, D. Kershaw, The Foundations of Anglo-American Corporate 
Fiduciary Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) at 416-418.  
32 Dean v. McDowell (1878) 8 Ch.D. 345; Aas v. Benham (1891) 2 Ch. 244.  
33 [2000] ICR 1462. 
34 [2000] ICR 1462 at 1495 (emphasis supplied). 
35 [1972] 2 ALL ER 162 at 173 (emphasis supplied). 
36 [2004] EWHC Civ 1244. 
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of duty. Lady Justice Arden (as she then was) observed that IDC, spoke of “the 
director owing a duty to disclose”.37   Yet, the extent to which IDC is authority 
for such a prescriptive duty it was not one that applied to Mr Cooley as 
director but as a senior-management fiduciary. Such a prescriptive duty of 
disclosure—to “pass on”—was the derivative product of his positive 
undertaking as a senior manager to devote himself on a full-time basis to 
identifying and acquiring such opportunities.38  It cannot, therefore, be 
generalised to the distinct fiduciary persona of director, which not only was not 
in issue in IDC, is incongruent with it. 
To see this more clearly, note the nature of Cooley’s fiduciary 
obligation would not have been any different had he not been a director, de jure 
or de facto.39 Although employees in English fiduciary law are not an established 
category of fiduciary, where they undertake a representative role to act on their 
employer’s behalf, and are empowered to act on their behalf, courts recognise 
them as fiduciaries to the extent of their contractually demarcated undertaking.  
In University of Nottingham v Fishel, for example, a senior employee who was 
given the title of director in a unit of the University of Nottingham’s Faculty of 
Medicine was held to be a fiduciary, although he was not a director of a 
company and his position could not “be equated with that of an executive 
director of a company”. However, in spite of being a fiduciary, the nature of 
his duty/undertaking did not, as was the case in IDC, include a “specific duty 
to secure the work abroad for the University”.40  Consider also Tesco Stores Ltd v 
Pook,41 Crowson Fabrics Ltd. v Rider42 and QBE Management Services (UK) Ltd v 
Dymoke,43 where senior managers who were not directors were held to be 
fiduciaries. In QBE Management Services, for example, the head of one of the 
claimant company’s divisions, who was not a director of the company, was 
found to be a fiduciary. In reaching this conclusion the court focused on his 
senior representative capacity, the trust reposed in him and his responsibility 
for “developing and implementing” the company’s strategic and business 
plans.  His contractual undertaking as senior manager involved a broad positive 
obligation to “promote and protect the interests of the group”; an undertaking 
that was transposed directly into his fiduciary “duty to use his best endeavours 
                                                          
37 [2004] EWHC Civ 1244 at [39] (emphasis supplied).  
38 L. Smith, ‘Fiduciary relationships: ensuring the loyal exercise of judgment on behalf of 
another’ (2014) 130 L.Q.R. 608, 631. 
39 See Section IV on fiduciary persona myopia and de facto directors.  
40 [2000] ICR 1462 at 1495. 
41 [2003] EWHC 823. 
42 [2007] EWHC 2942 (Ch). 
43 [2012] EWHC 80 (QB). 
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to promote and protect the interests of the Group of companies, of which [his 
company] formed part”.44   
Most late twentieth and early twenty-first century cases do not, as easily 
as IDC does, enable a reading of the case which distinguishes between the 
defendant’s directorial and managerial undertakings and functions. Most of 
these cases focus exclusively on the defendant’s duties as a director.  However, 
in many instances the duties in question are better characterised as arising from 
a managerial undertaking and have nothing to do with a directorial undertaking 
connected to the collective exercise of corporate power.  Consider, for 
example, Crown Dilmun v Sutton.45 In this case a manager-director of a real estate 
development company took an opportunity for himself after it had been 
presented to him in his managerial capacity at a meeting with a third party on 
company premises. The defendant was the “managing director” and the 
“dominant figure in the company”.46 His employment contract effectively 
prohibited outside investments and competition with the company;47 a contract 
upon which the court laid particular emphasis and in relation to which it 
referred to the “contracts of employment of fiduciaries”.48 However, although 
the court focuses on the defendant’s role and contractual undertakings as 
employee and managing director, its conclusions about the defendant’s duties 
are brought solely within his fiduciary capacity as director.  That is, although 
the court’s conclusions about his duties naturally reflected his full-time senior 
management undertaking and his contractual obligations vis a vis other 
investments and opportunities, these duties were then placed under the 
directorial umbrella.  The court concluded that “as a director…he had a duty to 
exploit every opportunity that he became aware of for the benefit of the 
claimants”.49 And it is these positive duties which arose from the managerial 
undertaking that support the court’s short, in-passing observation that the 
defendant director was under a duty to disclose his own misconduct.50 In Crown 
Dilmun the directorial role colonises the defendant’s other fiduciary personas.  
For more recent examples of the court’s fiduciary-persona myopia 
consider O’Donnell v Shanahan51 and Cullen Investments Ltd. v Brown.52 O’Donnell v 
                                                          
44 [2012] EWHC 80 at [28]. 
45 [2004] ALL ER (D) 222. 
46 [2004] ALL ER (D) 222 at [20]. 
47 [2004] ALL ER (D) 222 at [184]. 
48[2004] ALL ER (D) 222 at [51]. 
49 [2004] ALL ER (D) 222 at [179] (emphasis supplied). 
50 [2004] ALL ER (D) 222 at [181]. 
51 O’Donnell v Shanahan [2009] EWCA 751. 
52 [2017] EWHC 1586 (Ch). 
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Shanahan involved an action brought by one shareholder-director-manager 
against the two other shareholder-director-managers for an accounting of 
profits in relation to the taking of a corporate opportunity and lost 
commissions for the company in relation to that opportunity. The question the 
court asked was whether the taking of the opportunity breached the duties 
owed by them as directors. But both of these directors were also full-time 
managers; indeed, the Chancery Court at multiple junctures describes the 
company as a quasi-partnership and the director-managers as quasi-partners.53 
The opportunity itself came to them in their role as operational managers; a 
full-time role and undertaking consistent with the positive duty identified by 
the Court of Appeal to “to achieve a proper reward for the company for 
negotiating the sale of [the opportunity]”.54 Indeed, the board of directors and 
the collective exercise of corporate power by the board played no role in the 
identification, creation or approval of the opportunity. And yet, as was the case 
in Crown Dilmun, the obligations and positive duties of the defendants are 
understood by the Chancery Court and the Court of Appeal exclusively 
through the lens of their role “as directors”.  “Director” in O’Donnell v 
Shanahan is a receptacle for all the fiduciary obligations owed by an actual 
person who makes several distinctive fiduciary undertakings to the company. 
The same fiduciary-persona myopia can be seen more explicitly in 
Cullen Investments Limited v Brown, where a CEO/director, Mr Julian Brown, and 
a fellow director, Quentin Brown (who was not performing an executive 
role),55 took an opportunity in their personal capacities, which the company 
had been exploring taking for itself, although it was unclear whether the 
company was willing to provide the financing to acquire the opportunity. In its 
consideration of whether there had been a breach of the directors’ duties, in 
relation to Julian the court focused upon his role as CEO of the company. It 
was the set of obligations that follow from such a senior full-time undertaking 
which stand behind Mr Justice Barling’s identification of a broad positive 
directorial duty. For the court, the “seeking out [of] business opportunities, 
reviewing them, and if appropriate structuring and implementing them” were 
“carried out in his capacity of CEO”; and, “as [Julian] was paid a salary by [the 
company] for performing functions which included sourcing and implementing 
attractive property deals[,] it [was] simply not sustainable to suggest that in 
                                                          
53 [2008] EWHC 1973 at [7], [29] and [207]. 
54 [2009] EWCA 751 at [75]. 




those circumstances the opportunity did not come to [him] in his capacity of a 
director”.56  
In Crown Dilmun and O’Donnell, placing the managerial fiduciary 
undertaking under the directorial umbrella necessarily made no difference to 
the outcome of the case: in both cases the defendants would have been liable 
on the same fiduciary grounds had the case focused only on the defendants as 
managerial fiduciaries. However, the category error made in these cases—as 
well as the category error involved in treating IDC as a case addressing the 
fiduciary obligations of directors—becomes problematic when the “directorial” 
obligations identified in these cases are treated as being universally applicable 
to any person who is appointed as a director, with the effect that some 
directors, such as Jill from Example A or Quentin Brown in Cullen, are deemed 
to have made fiduciary undertakings which they have not made and which they 
were not asked to perform.  Quentin, who was also found to be in breach of 
duty, was only a director and performed no executive role, yet for the court as 
both Julian and Quentin held the status of director they were subject to the 
same obligations: “as director he was subject to the same fiduciary and other duties as 
[Julian]”.57  Naturally, given the absorption into the directorial obligation of 
Julian’s managerial undertaking, this included for Quentin an expansive and 
prescriptive duty of “undivided loyalty” to the company;58 a duty which (as we 
can see from the discussion of Example A above) is wholly inconsistent with a 
mere directorial undertaking. As Quentin’s only fiduciary persona was as a 
director there was no positive directorial duty to be performed in relation to 
the opportunity and therefore no disclosure obligation in relation thereto. 
Accordingly, there could be no breach of directorial duty or a conflict of duty 
and interest59 until the matter was addressed by the board.60   
Such effects could be prevented if courts, whilst treating the status of 
director as a receptacle for all fiduciary undertakings, were to consider each 
director individually and to treat findings as to the undertakings made by one 
director as being of no precedential value when considering the fiduciary 
undertakings of any other director.  Although impure from a fiduciary law 
perspective, such an approach would quarantine these legal risks. Courts, 
however, have not taken this path, and treat prior holdings as explorations of 
                                                          
56 [2017] EWHC 1586 (Ch) at [238]. 
57 [2017] EWHC 1586 (Ch) at [250]. 
58 [2017] EWHC 1586 (Ch) at 251. 
59 On the no-conflict rule see Section III.2 below. 
60 See infra note 123 on the likely application of the no-profit rule in this case.  
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the obligations of the status of “director”.61 As a result these legal risks are now 
beginning to crystalize. 
 
 
III. FIDUCIARY PERSONA MYOPIA AND THE NO-CONFLICT 
RULE 
 
1. Undertaking and Directorial Competition  
The law on whether directors are allowed to serve on the boards of competitor 
companies or compete directly with the company is generally viewed as 
perplexing. Several commentators suggest62 that we would expect that as 
serving a competitor of the company generates an obvious conflict of interest 
or duty with duty that it would be prohibited. It is “strange”,63 therefore to 
discover that late nineteenth and 20th century authority approved of directors 
serving on the boards of competitor companies.   
The permissive stance with respect to directorial competition contrasts 
with the position in partnership law, which provides that a partner is 
prohibited from competing with the partnership, and is prevented from 
pursuing opportunities that fall within the scope of the partnership’s business.64 
Courts and commentators have often noted the stark contrast between 
partnership law and company law in this regard, but typically do so to suggest 
that the directorial position is anomalous within fiduciary law.65 However, 
through careful attention to the scope and ambit of the directorial undertaking 
we are able to see that there is no anomaly.  
An active partner is prohibited from competing with the partnership 
because of the undertaking which she has given—to dedicate herself on a full-
time basis to the governance, operation and betterment of the partnership; a 
prescriptive undertaking that is continually being performed so long as she 
remains a partner. Necessarily such a positive managerial and operational duty 
                                                          
61 See, for example, Crown Dilmun [2004] ALL ER (D) 222 at [179]-[180] and Item Software (UK) v 
Fassihi [2005] 2 BCLC 91 at [39].  
62 See Palmer’s Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell) at [8.534]; and P. Davies and S. 
Worthington, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 10th eds 
2016) at 552 (a sentiment articulated in earlier editions, eg. P. Davies, Gower’s Principles of Modern 
Companies Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 6th eds, 1997) at 622). 
63 P. Davies and S. Worthington, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 10th eds 2016) at 552. 
64 Dean v Macdowell (1878) 8 Ch.D. 345, 353. The competition prohibition is codified in s. 30 of 
the Partnership Act 1890. 
65 P. Davies and S. Worthington, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 10th eds 2016) at 552. 
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would conflict with any attempt to further her personal interests through 
another venture that falls within the scope of the partnership business. For the 
Court of Appeal in Dean v Macdowell, for example, a partner would not be 
capable of competing with the company, or taking an opportunity that fell 
within the scope of the partnership, because “it is [the business] which he 
ought to have engaged in only for the purposes of the partnership”.66 
Accordingly, any attempts whatsoever to form, to actively explore the 
possibility of forming, or to join a competitor whilst a partner remains subject 
to this undertaking would result in her being in breach of duty—for either 
actively contravening the undertaking or failing to disclose the competitive 
activity which may be viewed as a derivative duty of the positive 
undertaking67—as well as being in breach of the no-conflict obligation at the 
moment such personal interests are concretised.68 Senior managers give a very 
similar fiduciary undertaking; they are, therefore, also subject to such a 
competition prohibition.69  But when we distinguish the directorial from the 
managerial undertaking and ask what is involved in the role of director and the 
agreement to serve as a director, we see that a director is not qua director subject 
to such a positive undertaking and therefore competition, and board service 
with a competitor, is possible, although sometimes difficult to manage and 
police.  
 To see this, consider the directorial undertaking given by Jill as a non-
executive director in Example A in Section II.1 above. Jill’s undertaking relates 
to the collective exercise of delegated power, and responsibility for that 
delegation, to be performed at periodic board meetings which she does not call 
or determine the agenda of. Mere membership of a board of a competitor 
company (Company B) does not generate any possibility for conflict of interest 
and duty to Company A. But does such a conflict arise when she attends a 
board meeting of one of the companies to perform her undertaking, for 
example, in relation to a new opportunity considered by the board of Company 
B that would be significant interest to, but is not to her knowledge being 
considered by, Company A? From Company A’s perspective as the matter has 
not been brought before the board of Company A, Jill’s duty/undertaking to 
Company A is not in play. She has therefore no duty to perform in her role as 
a director of Company A at that moment in relation to such opportunity.  Of 
                                                          
66 (1878) 8 Ch.D. 345 at 354.  
67 See text to notes 36-38. 
68 (1878) 8 Ch.D. 345 per James LJ at 350. 
69 Shepherd Investments Ltd v Walters [2006] EWHC 836 (Ch.); QBE Management Services (UK) Ltd v 
Dymoke (2012) EWHC 80. 
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course, if the matter is also brought before Company A then the performance 
of her duties are in conflict70 and she must obtain authorisation from both 
companies, or resign her position from one of the companies.   From 
Company B’s perspective, however, one might say that a director participating 
in a board decision for Company B is subject to a conflict of duty and interest 
arising from the existence of the competing directorship with Company A.   
Clearly the director’s duty for Company B is being performed so whether there 
is a breach of the no-conflict rule depends on whether the personal “interest” 
arising from that competing directorship is an “interest” for the purpose of 
this rule. The legal boundaries of “interest” have, however, received limited 
attention in the case law. It is clear from the authorities that many general 
“interests” in other capacities are not legally cognizable for this no-conflict 
duty—interests arising from, for example: the performance of a duty that 
affected the personal interests of a director’s colleagues/friends;71  keeping 
your job as director and manager in the context of a contested takeover offer;72 
or, in a company in the vicinity of insolvency, the non-aligned interests of the 
shareholder constituency (of which the director is a member) with the interests 
of creditors, in whose interests the director is now required to act.73 The 
authorities where a breach has been established suggest that for the no-conflict 
duty “interest” must be a personal and realised financial one74 and one that 
arises in the context of the performance of the duty; a position which Lord 
Eldon articulated when he observed in Ex Parte Lacey, one of the foundational 
no-conflict cases, that that a trustee must not “manage for the benefit and 
advantage of himself”.75 Classic examples of such performance related 
interest/profit are any of the self-dealing cases that established the rule, but 
                                                          
70 See Paterson v Portobello Town-Hall Company (1866) 4 M 726. See also, Ex parte Bennett (1805) 10 
Vesey Junior 381 and Boulting v Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians [1960] 
2 QB 606. See generally, M. Conaglen, ‘Fiduciary Regulation of Conflicts between Duties’ 
(2009) 129 L.Q.R.359. 
71 Regentcrest v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80. 
72 Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd[1967] 3 ALL 420. 
73 Colin Gwyer & Associates v Palmer [2002] EWHC 2748. 
74 For a rare direct consideration of this issue consider David Richards J’s (as he then was) 
observation in Newgate Stud Company v Penfold [2004] All ER (D) 372 that “none of the 
statements of principle or authorities to which I referred define it in terms other than a 
personal financial interest, direct or indirect of the director” (at [231]). See also, Cullen 
Investments Ltd v Brown [2017] EWHC 1586 (Ch) where the defendant did not have a personal 
interest for the purposes of this rule merely by virtue of his defendant brother’s interest but 
only when “the promise of a share of the profits was made and accepted” (at [253]). But see 
also Burns v Financial Conduct Authority [2017] EWCA Civ 2140 providing for a broader reading 
of interest. 
75 Ex parte Lacey (1802) 6 Vesey Junior 626, 626 (emphasis supplied). 
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also leading opportunities cases including Keech v Sandford76 and Regal Hastings v 
Gulliver,77 which are best read in this way.78 This view of “interest” would not 
result in the competing director acting for Company B being in breach of the 
no-conflict prohibition in these circumstances.  
This understanding of the relationship between the directorial 
undertaking and the competition permission is seen clearly from the case that 
established that directors could take a position on a competitor’s board: the 
much maligned London and Mashonaland Exploration Company, Limited v New 
Mashonaland Exploration Company, Limited.79 In that case the plaintiff company 
brought an action against the defendant company and Lord Mayo, who was a 
director of the plaintiff company, to prevent an announcement that Lord Mayo 
was a director of the defendant company. The court observed that there was 
nothing in the articles, nor was there any express or implied contract requiring 
Lord Mayo “to give any part of his time…to the business of the company” or “to 
give his personal services to the plaintiff company”; nor did the articles 
prohibit him from becoming “a director of any similar company”.  That is, 
Lord Mayo’s undertaking related only to board service not to the operation of 
the business.  Accordingly, although taking the competing directorship was in 
Lord Mayo’s personal interest, the mere appointment, as in Jill’s case above, 
did not and could not, conflict with his undertaken duty.  It was for this reason 
that Chitty J concluded that “the analogy sought to be drawn by the plaintiff 
company’s counsel between the present case and partnerships was 
incomplete”.  For Chitty J the directorial undertaking given by Lord Mayo was 
not comparable to that of a partner; although it is submitted that it would have 
been, and Lord Mayo would have been prohibited from being a director of the 
competitor company, had he given a full-time managerial undertaking in 
relation to “the business of the company”.  
London Mashonaland was given the imprimatur of the House of Lords in 
Bell v Lever Brothers Limited;80 approval which modern courts have struggled to 
come to terms with. However, again, through careful attention to the fiduciary 
undertaking we can see that the decision does not represent a pre-modern 
aberration in which courts failed to take the role of directors seriously. The 
company was a trading company which, inter alia, dealt in cocoa. The defendant 
                                                          
76 [1558-1774] All ER Rep 230. 
77 [1967] 2 AC 134. 
78 See D. Kershaw, The Foundations of Anglo-American Corporate Fiduciary Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018) at 389-394. 
79 (1891) WN 165. 
80 [1932] A.C. 161. 
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directors (chair and vice chair of the board) were also senior managers tasked 
with “the reorganization and management” of the plaintiff company. In their 
personal capacities the manager-directors entered into four commodities 
exchange transactions in cocoa differences. One of the questions in issue was 
whether this involved a breach of duty. The court concluded that the directors 
“had no liability whatsoever”. The consideration of this issue was placed by 
Lord Blanesburgh within the lens of competing with the company and, citing 
London Mashonaland favourably, he observed that what a director could do for 
another company he could “do for himself”. However, central to this holding 
was that their undertakings to the company did not involve an undertaking to 
refrain “from private speculations of their own…in stocks and shares”.81  For 
the House of Lords, the director-managers’ full time undertaking did not 
encompass a duty to refrain from commodities market trading for their 
personal account; accordingly, they had no duty to perform for the company in 
relation to those market transactions. The court would not, however, have 
countenanced, for example, consulting for a competitor, as that would have 
violated the undertaking to “devote all [their] time and attention during 
business hours”82 to the company.  
The position set forth in London Mashonaland, and approved of in Bell v. 
Lever Brothers, is treated in commentary and case law as a problematic anomaly.  
Pearlie Koh, for example, has described the rule as “aberrational and difficult 
to defend”.83 In In re Plus Group Ltd v Pyke,84 Sedley LJ observed that 
commentators’ views of the permission “range from the dubious to the 
sceptical” and suggested that the rule required “reconsideration in the light of 
modern standards and jurisprudence”.85  He weighed in against an expansive 
interpretation of London Mashonaland, observing that “there has never been any 
warrant for treating [Chitty J’s] decision or its endorsement in the House of 
Lords as a license for directors or other fiduciaries to put themselves or to stay 
put in situations where their duties and/or interests can come into conflict”.  
He observed further that the Mashonaland “principle” is “a very limited one”; “if 
for example”, he suggested, “the two Mashonaland Exploration companies had 
been preparing to tender for the same contract, I doubt whether Lord Mayo’s 
position would have been tenable”.86 
                                                          
81 [1932] A.C. 161 at 196. 
82 [1932] A.C. 161 at 201. 
83 P. Koh, ‘The Director’s Fiduciary Obligations – a Fresh Look’ (2003) 62 C.L.J. 42. 
84 [2002] EWCA Civ 370. 
85 [2002] EWCA Civ 370 at [81], [88]. 
86 [2002] EWCA Civ 370 at [84], [88]. 
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Through the lens of fiduciary undertaking foregrounded in this article, 
Sedley LJ’s critique is perplexing. There is no Mashonaland “principle”; no 
exception or qualification87 to the no conflict of duty and interest rule arising 
from the case, merely an application of that rule to Lord Mayo’s narrow 
directorial undertaking. And there is no question—nor would Chitty J have 
been in any doubt—that had Lord Mayo been voting on the same contract for 
both companies then there would have been a prohibited conflict—not of, for 
the reasons outlined above, of duty and interest but of duty and duty. 
Moreover, Sedley LJ’s approach in In re Plus Group can be read as being entirely 
consistent with London Mashonaland. The director (and former 50% shareholder 
and manager) who had competed with the firm had been prevented from 
performing any directorial or managerial role.  Per Sedley LJ, as he had no 
representative capacity (“his role as a director of the claimant’s was throughout 
the relevant period entirely nominal”) he had no director’s duty to perform. 
For Sedley LJ, in effect he was no longer a director—or for that matter a 
senior manager—subject to the no-conflict prohibition: “he might as well have 
resigned”.88   That is, the actions of the other director in this case rendered the 
defendant’s fiduciary undertaking(s) and the authority transfer to perform the 
undertaking nugatory.  There was, therefore, no duty to perform which could 
be breached or conflict with the ex-director’s personal interest in the 
competing activity.89 An approach which is structurally identical to that taken 
in London Mashonaland and Bell v Lever Brothers, where the limited nature of the 
undertaking meant that there was no conflict with the undertaken duty in the 
circumstances of those cases.   
Sedley LJ’s judgment is, therefore, paradoxical. Whilst he is critical and 
disapproving of London Mashonaland, his decision can be understood through 
the same approach and rule: if there is no undertaking to perform which 
conflicts with competitive activity, then there can be no breach of duty or 
violation of the no-conflict rule. The reason for this paradox is that Sedley LJ 
implicitly assumes that for any functioning director breach and conflict is 
unavoidable in any competing situation. It follows, therefore, that Mashonaland 
must be a strange and ill-considered90 exception which in limited circumstances 
suspends an ostensible breach and allows a normally prohibited conflict to 
                                                          
87 British Midland Tool v Midland International Tooling Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 523 at [81] referring to 
London Mashonaland as a “qualification”. 
88 [2002] EWCA Civ 370 at [90]. 
89 See M. Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) at 183 stressing the 
disappearance of the undertaking (“the non-fiduciary duty”). 
90 Sedley LJ emphasises the extempore nature of Chitty J’s judgment on an interlocutory 
motion ([2002] EWCA Civ 370 at [79].  
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persist.  This assumption, however, implicitly merges directorial and managerial 
undertakings under the director umbrella implying that directors have a broad 
positive duty to protect the corporate interest which will, as with partners, 
necessarily prevent competitive activity.  It fails to see that the directorial 
undertaking is a distinct and limited fiduciary undertaking which may conflict 
with another duty or personal interest, but is much less likely to than a positive 
managerial or partner undertaking.  Chitty J had clear sight of this. Indeed, 
distinguishing between the directorial and managerial fiduciary personas, we 
see that in In re Plus Group had the defendant not been excluded from the 
company he would have been prevented from competing with the company on 
two separate fiduciary grounds: first because his positive managerial 
undertaking would have prevented any such competition; and second, because 
as the competing company was pursuing the same clients there would in all 
likelihood also have been a conflict of duty and duty with his narrow directorial 
undertaking when the matter was addressed by the board.  
The implicit prescriptive understanding of the directorial obligation set 
forth in In re Plus Group is aligned with the merging of managerial undertakings 
under the directorial umbrella seen above in Cullen, Crown Dilmun, and 
O’Donnell, as well as in the standard interpretation of IDC.  This understanding 
of directorial obligation renders the competition permission unsustainable, and 
renders the cases that approved of it “dubious” legal landmarks to be managed 
and quarantined. However, given Bell v Lever Brothers’ approval of London 
Mashonaland, it cannot just be ignored or deemed incorrect by lower courts.  
The result is notable judicial contortion and uncertainty.  Consider, for 
example, British Midland Tool Ltd v Midland International Tool Limited91 where 
director-senior managers of the claimant company set up a competing 
enterprise which contributed to the failure of the company.  As is 
commonplace in contemporary UK corporate fiduciary law, the court in British 
Midland does not distinguish between the defendants’ directorial and 
managerial fiduciary undertakings, and incorporates the positive managerial 
undertakings within the directorial umbrella, resulting in what the court 
thought should be a “simple [and generalizable] proposition” that “a director 
would be under a duty to alert [their] fellow members to a nascent commercial 
threat to the future prospects of the company”.92  The court’s preference in 
British Midland was clearly to hold that competitive activity was incompatible 
with the positive directorial obligation they identified, but because the court 
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did not distinguish between directorial and managerial fiduciary undertakings 
the court thought that London Mashonaland and Bell v Lever Brothers stood in the 
way of this.   The court’s workaround involved holding that competitive 
directorships, although lawful, could not be maintained in the absence of 
disclosure and, as the directors had failed to disclose whilst they were directors, 
they were in breach of duty.    
Seen through the undertaking lens promulgated in this article, the court 
reached the correct conclusion but that conclusion was based on a flawed 
fiduciary analysis. As managerial fiduciaries, just like partner fiduciaries, 
engaging in competitive activity was a breach of their full-time, positive duty to 
further British Midland Tool’s interests, and any profits resulting therefrom 
amounted to a breach of the no-conflict prohibition; a position that would 
have garnered Chitty J’s approval. Importantly, disclosure alone would not be 
enough to avoid breach, only an independent board93 authorising the conflict 
following full disclosure would suffice. But through this undertaking-centric 
lens, they had no general positive duty qua directors94 to protect the company, to 
pursue the general corporate interest or disclose threats which they were aware 
of; indeed their board undertaking was not triggered at all precisely because the 
competitive activity was hidden—the case does not refer to any board 
decisions during this period.95  
 
2. Inventing a Conflict of Interests? 
Above we saw that precise attention to the subject’s fiduciary persona(s) and 
the undertaking given qua director, senior manager or partner allows us to 
make sense of the much maligned early case law dealing with the duty to avoid 
a conflict of interest and duty (or of duty and duty) in the context of 
competitive board service. And such attention to undertaking provided clearer 
sight of how the competition permission should function today. However, that 
analysis sidestepped the more fundamental transformation in the nature of the 
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no-conflict rule which has taken place in the past 20 years; a largely unnoticed 
change from a conflict of interest and duty to a conflict of interests. This subtle 
anti-director re-presentation of the no-conflict rule significantly expands the 
restraints on personal business activity imposed on directors. Corporate law’s 
fiduciary and undertaking myopia is again a central component of this 
transformation.  
As we have observed, Conaglen’s key insight96 is that fiduciary duties 
serve the performance of what he refers to as non-fiduciary duties, which are 
the duties to perform the representative role the fiduciary undertook and was 
empowered to perform.  Through this lens we see that all the general duties to 
which a fiduciary in her representative capacity is subject are designed to 
enhance the performance of the undertaken duty.  Axiomatically, the conflict 
prohibition is organized around the undertaken duty, as a means of enhancing 
its effective performance by preventing a directors’ personal interests from 
interfering with the performance of the undertaking.  That is, the prohibition 
both was and is a prohibition on a conflict of undertaken duty with personal 
interests or of duty with duty.  It was not a duty addressing a conflict of the 
beneficiary/principal’s general interest (what would be of interest to it) and the 
fiduciary’s personal interest. At most, until recently, such a conflict of interests 
rule could only be a short-cut expression where the undertaken duty was to 
proactively act/take all necessary steps to further the principal/beneficiaries’ 
interests. Yet today, for directors, section 175 of the Companies Act 2006 
provides that the duty as regards opportunities and information about 
opportunities is to avoid a situation in which personal interest conflicts or may 
possibly conflict with “the interests of the company”.  A statement of the law 
taken, almost verbatim, from the statement of principle set forth in 1854 by 
Lord Cranworth in Aberdeen Railway Company v. Blaikie Brothers.97  Section 175(7) 
provides that this prohibition applies also to a conflict of interest and duty, 
suggesting implicitly that the conflict of interests prohibition is distinctive and 
the primary rule.  
The idea that fiduciary law prohibits a conflict of general corporate and 
personal interests is the product of late twentieth century case law. There are 
two drivers of this development. The first is the elevation and literal 
interpretation of Lord Cranworth’s statement of principle in Aberdeen Railway 
brought about by Lord Upjohn’s jurisprudence, most importantly in his House 
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of Lords’ judgment in Boardman v Phipps.98 In Aberdeen Railway—English law’s 
foundational corporate self-dealing case—the board of the Aberdeen Railway 
Company approved a transaction to buy railway chairs from a partnership in 
which the chairman of the board was also a partner.  Lord Cranworth’s 
holding, following existing fiduciary law, established that without shareholder 
approval such self-dealing contracts were voidable. In reaching his conclusion, 
Lord Cranworth referred to “a rule of universal application” that: 
No one having duties to discharge shall be allowed to enter into engagements in 
which he has or can have a personal interest conflicting or which possibly may 
conflict with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect.99 
It is clear that Lord Cranworth did not think that in making this statement of 
principle he was altering the then prevailing legal rule prohibiting a conflict of 
duty and interest or duty with duty. As the case involved a self-dealing contract 
approved by the board the statement was made in a context which necessarily 
involved a conflict of exercised duty and interest.  Referring to Lord Eldon’s 
foundational no-conflict jurisprudence100 to support his statement, Lord 
Cranworth observed that “the English authorities on this subject are numerous 
and uniform”101 and singled out Ex Parte James, where Lord Eldon held that no 
benefit, or ostensible benefit, could be made in the performance of the duty. 
Moreover, in applying the no-conflicts principle Lord Cranworth focuses on 
the director’s conflict of duty and personal interest. The reason, for example, 
that Lord Cranworth concluded that the fact that the majority of directors 
were disinterested was irrelevant, was not because there nevertheless remained 
a conflict of company and personal interest but because a conflict of duty and 
interest remained as the director’s “duty [was] to give his co-directors, and 
through them to the company, the full benefit of all the knowledge and skill he 
could bring to bear on the subject”.102  
The only instance prior to Aberdeen Railway in which an English court 
refers to a conflict of interests is Lord Brougham’s judgment in Hamilton v 
Wright103 in 1842. Lord Brougham was the only other named judge in the 
House of Lord’s judgment in Aberdeen Railway. In Hamilton v Wright a trust was 
created for the benefit of a debtor’s creditors with any residue for the benefit 
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of the debtor. The trustee purchased an annuity that had been granted by the 
debtor, rendering any decision the trustee made in the exercise of the 
performance of the trust in conflict with his personal financial interests as a 
creditor. Lord Brougham held that “it was his duty as trustee to do nothing for 
the impairing or destruction of the trust, nor to place himself in a position 
inconsistent with the interests of the trust”.104 However, as in Aberdeen Railway, it is 
evident from the case that Lord Brougham was not of the view that this 
statement represented a departure from the conflict of duty and interest rule, 
which at multiple junctures structures his judgment. For Lord Brougham, the 
trustee’s purchase of the annuity was invalid because “his duty was to keep the 
residue as large as possible” whilst he had a direct “interest in cutting it 
down”.105   
Over a century later in Boardman v Phipps, where agent-fiduciaries of a 
trust took a business opportunity that arose out of shares held by the trust, 
Lord Upjohn commenced his analysis with reference to “the fundamental rule of 
equity… that a trustee must not place himself in a position where his duty and 
his interest conflict”.106  He supported this statement by citing Lord Hershell in 
Bray v. Ford who observed “that it is an inflexible rule of equity” that a 
fiduciary is “not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and 
duty conflict” to avoid the fiduciary “being swayed by interest rather than 
duty”;107 a case that makes no reference to a conflict of interests. For Lord 
Upjohn it was this no-conflict of duty and interest rule “that is perhaps stated 
most highly”108 by Lord Cranworth’s conflict of interests principle, a principle 
that later in his judgment Lord Upjohn also refers to as an “exemplifi[cation]” 
of “the fundamental principle”.109  That duty is the reference point for conflict 
is also clear from Lord Upjohn’s approach to the case, which takes as is the 
starting point the question: “what is the scope and ambit of the duties charged 
upon him”.110 The answer to this question was determinative of whether there 
had been a breach of duty and whether “his duty and interest may possibly 
conflict”.   
Nevertheless, although Lord Upjohn, like Lords Cranworth and 
Brougham, envisaged no legal departure by referring to a conflict of interests, 
the literal meaning of a conflict of interests—which poses the question: what 
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are the interests of the fiduciary’s charge?—naturally takes on its own legal 
significance. We see this in Lord Upjohn’s judgment in Boardman itself. In an 
important example provided to support his position that the agent-fiduciaries 
had not placed their duty in conflict with their interest, Lord Upjohn outlined a 
hypothetical example of a trust holding Blackacre, which is adjacent to 
Whiteacre.111 In this example, he argues that there is no question of the trustees 
or the beneficiaries being generally “interested” in Whiteacre and the trustee 
would not therefore be precluded from buying Whiteacre for himself even if 
he found out information about Whiteacre as a result of the trusteeship. For 
Lord Upjohn as “they have no interest in Whiteacre… their trustees have no duty to 
perform in respect thereof”.112 In this example, a conflict of interests structures 
the analysis. Moreover, the determination of duty follows and is subordinate to 
general trust interests, even though duty is not—and was not in Boardman v. 
Phipps—a function of general trust interests. We also see here that where duty 
is derived from general interest it is ineluctably prescriptive.  
A second, and symbiotic, driver of the shift towards the independent 
legal significance of a conflict of interests is the fiduciary-persona myopia 
phenomenon addressed in this article.  If the managerial undertaking is 
absorbed into the directorial role, and the status of director is treated as 
involving a full-time undertaking to positively and continuously further the 
corporate interest, then even though the legal prohibition relates to a conflict 
of duty and interest, the nature of the prescriptive duty is such that to state the 
prohibition in terms of a conflict of interests is congruent with, and is an 
alternative expression of, the duty/interest prohibition.  Put differently, the 
conflict of interests rule is a short-cut version of the traditional no conflict of 
duty and interest rule when the director is deemed to have undertaken (or a 
person who occupies the status of director is treated as being subject to) a 
broad, prescriptive obligation to further the corporate interest.   In this regard, 
it is noteworthy that Lord Cranworth’s no-conflict of interests statement itself 
may be read through this short-cut lens. Although the precise managerial role 
of the defendant director-chairman in Aberdeen Railway is unclear on the facts, 
Lord Cranworth appears to view him though a managerial lens with an 
accompanying expansive prescriptive duty.  He observed, in his consideration 
of the relevance of Lord Eldon’s foundational no-conflict jurisprudence to the 
corporation, that “I cannot entertain a doubt of its being applicable to the case 
of a party who is acting as a manager of a mercantile or trading business”. And 
                                                          
111 [1967] 2 AC 46 at 130. 
112 [1967] 2 AC 46 at 130. 
27 
 
in relation to the defendant’s role as chairman, he observed that “it was his 
bounden duty to make the best bargains he could for the benefit of the 
company”.113 Moreover, it is also noteworthy that all of the pre-2006 corporate 
cases considered below which treat the conflict of interests framework as the 
operational rule for directors, involved directorial defendants who performed 
managerial functions. In these cases, the failure to distinguish between 
corporate fiduciary personas and the resulting implicit or explicit absorption of 
the positive managerial undertaking into the directorial role renders the 
restatement of the rule as a conflict of interests uncontroversial and thereby 
enables the literal application, and the independent legal significance, of Lord 
Cranworth’s version of the “fundamental rule”.  
Consider, for example, Bhullar v Bhullar where manager-directors of a 
company took for themselves a real estate opportunity situated next to 
property owned by the company. Following extensive citation of the section of 
Lord Upjohn’s speech that details Lord Cranworth’s “fundamental rule”, at 
first instance the court held that the directors were liable to account because 
“this was a case where the interests of [the company] and those of [the 
directors] conflicted”.114  In the Court of Appeal in Bhullar the court similarly 
adopts a conflict of interest framework where duty follows interest: as the 
opportunity was “commercially attractive”115 to the company the defendant 
directors had a positive “duty to communicate” it to the company, and they 
were therefore in breach of duty and the no-conflict prohibition. Here we see 
an inversion of the traditional rule, intimated in Lord Upjohn’s 
Whiteacre/Blackacre example. Under the traditional rule, where a corporate 
fiduciary has given a broad prescriptive undertaking to act in the interest of the 
company then what is in the company’s interests is relevant to the demarcation 
of duty; and when she has not given such an undertaking then corporate 
interest alone cannot be determinative of the scope and ambit of the duty. But 
here the conflicts of interest/s rule is the starting point which structures the 
investigation and is applicable to all directors.  And the duty to disclose the 
opportunity arises not from an exploration of the scope and ambit of the 
undertaking but from the fact that the opportunity is of interest to the 
company.116  Other pre-2006 cases similarly evidence the developing 
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independent legal significance of the idea of a conflict of interests and all of 
them involved manager-directors.117  
Following the enactment of section 175 of the Act, the literal conflict 
of interests approach now naturally dominates the law.  Consider, for example, 
O’Donnell v O’Shanahan,118 where the court adopts a conflict of interests 
framework which, alongside the merging of the directorial and managerial 
undertakings,119 contributes to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the 
defendants “as directors” had a positive duty to “to achieve a proper reward for 
the company”. Consider also Cullen Investments Ltd v Brown,120 where the court’s 
consideration of section 175 is structured by the determination of whether the 
opportunity in question is of interest to the company, or Sharma v Sharma, 
where the courts application of 175’s no-conflict of interests prohibition drives 
the conclusion that the director has a duty to seek out opportunities which “he 
could and should exploit for the benefit of the company”.121  
This shift towards a conflict of interests represents a significant late-
20th century expansion of the constraints imposed by the no-conflicts rule on 
the director’s personal affairs; 122 which is of particularly concern for directors 
who do not also perform a full-time managerial function. Recall Jill’s 
undertaking and duty, which is not an undertaking to act positively but one 
related to the exercise of power in periodic board meetings. For her, a 
prohibition on placing herself in a position in which her personal interests 
conflict with the general interests of the company is wholly different than the 
effects of the prohibition on the conflict of exercised duty and company 
interest.  Through a traditional lens, as she had not given a positive 
undertaking to be performed in relation to an opportunity that has not been 
presented to the board, if she takes that opportunity for herself she does not 
breach the no-conflict of interest and duty prohibition, although depending on 
the circumstances she may be in breach of the no-profit rule, which is not 
considered here. But under the modern conflict of interests prohibition, if the 
opportunity falls within the general interests of the company she is, without 
authorisation from the company, prevented from financially benefiting from it.  
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And this is not merely a theoretical concern. Recall Quentin Brown, one of the 
directors in Cullen Investments Limited v Brown discussed above. Although he was 
not a manager and had given only a narrow directorial undertaking, his 
involvement in the corporate opportunity placed his interests in conflict with 
the companies and, therefore, he was deemed to have violated section 175. 
Whereas on traditional principles he would not have been liable on this basis123 
because given the nature of his undertaking he had no duty to perform in 
relation to the opportunity.  
Important work in this regard by Simon Witney124 attempts to curtail 
the extended reach of this no-conflict of interests principle by arguing that 
persons who are directors operate in multiple capacities and when operating in 
a different (fully disclosed and authorised) capacity they are not in a fiduciary 
relationship with the company and not subject to fiduciary duties in relation to 
the activities associated with that separate capacity. That is, when operating in 
another (fully disclosed and authorised) capacity the “court is likely to find that 
there is no duty to avoid a conflicts of interest (or indeed any other duty…)”.125 
The benefit of this approach is that, taking the law as it currently stands, it 
offers a sensible limit on the expansive reach of the new conflict of interest 
approach; a reach that, as Witney shows, is wholly inapposite for directors who 
are not managers, particular in a private equity setting where directors may 
have several other directorial and managerial capacities in companies whose 
interests may overlap.126 If one accepts the transition from conflict of interest 
and duty to conflicts of interests, Witney’s approach is the most pragmatic way 
of dealing with its problematic effects by demarcating the situations in which it 
does and does not apply. The downside of the approach is that it addresses 
only the legal symptom and not the cause of the problem, and it only addresses 
the symptom for those directors who have other directorial capacities which 
they can disclose ex ante and obtain authorisation for.  
An undertaking-focused approach, sensitive to the distinctive nature of 
each fiduciary undertakings, would address the cause of the problem and 
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provide a cleaner solution for all individuals who have only given a directorial 
undertaking.  Through an undertaking-focused lens which views the no-
conflict principle as a means of regulating that undertaking, no matter what 
other roles or capacities a person who is a fiduciary has, as a fiduciary she is 
always a fiduciary and the general duties always apply to the undertaking until 
she rejects the undertaking (resignation) or the authorization is revoked 
(dismissal). However, although such an undertaking is always subject to the 
general duties the undertaking given by a director is a narrow one, leaving 
significant scope for lawful business activities that do not bring personal 
interest into conflict with the undertaking (and therefore do not require 
disclosure and authorisation), even though a layman might describe such 
actions as involving a conflict of interests.   But where the director is also a 
managerial fiduciary, the breadth and positive nature of her managerial 
undertaking means that the no-conflict of interest and duty rule would leave 




IV. FIDUCIARY-PERSONA MYOPIA AND DE FACTO DIRECTORS 
 
Fiduciary-persona myopia has not only severely compromised the law of 
director’s duties, it has also resulted in doctrinal contortion surrounding the 
question of which individuals should be treated as de facto directors.  
The question whether a person, typically a senior manager, should be 
treated as a de facto director when she has clearly not been appointed as a 
director is a question of modern vintage. As Lord Collins observed in Re 
Paycheck,127 traditionally the “de facto director” question related to whether a 
person who had ostensibly been appointed as a director was still to be treated 
as a director in spite of some flaw in the appointment process which meant she 
had not actually been appointed as a director.128 New legal questions are often 
the product of changes in legislative provisions or market conditions, or of 
longstanding problems that had not been brought into focus by litigation. They 
can, however, also be the product of shifts in the structure or conceptual 
framework of legal thought which create the question. The modern de facto 
director question can be seen through both of these lenses. Questions 
surrounding, for example, whether the directors or shareholders of corporate 
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directors are de facto directors129 are the product of the exploration of extant, 
but previously backgrounded questions. But in several modern cases, questions 
relating to whether real people, typically managers, are de facto directors are of 
the law’s own making; they are the product of its fiduciary-persona myopia.   
If a senior manager who has not been appointed as a director attends 
and votes at board meetings, or is involved in informal processes that exercise 
board power, and the other directors acquiesce to his acting as a director then 
he is an empowered fiduciary and his directorial undertaking is subject to 
fiduciary restraint.  This is why in Re Hydrodam, Millet J (as he then was), in 
determining whether the defendant was a de facto director for the purposes of 
section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, focused first on the question of 
“whether he undertook functions in relation to the company which could 
properly be discharged only by a director”,130 and second, on whether such an 
undertaking was combined with congruent empowerment which he finds is 
implicit where the person is “held out as a director by the company”.131  
Labelling a person a de facto director is merely a short-cut for these underlying 
elemental fiduciary facts.  But what of a senior manager who does not attend 
and vote at board meetings, who makes no directorial undertaking and who is 
not informally empowered (through acquiescence, holding out or otherwise) to 
participate in the collective exercise of board power? It seems self-evident that 
such a person could not possibly be labelled a de facto director, no matter how 
powerful or important her role is as a manager; just as a drummer who is 
crucial to the performance of a band is not, by reason of her centrality, the 
guitarist.  Yet in several recent cases courts have mistakenly treated such 
managers as de facto directors. The driver of this error is fiduciary-persona 
myopia which results in some courts concluding that senior managers who are 
not de jure directors can only be subject to fiduciary obligations if they are 
deemed to be de facto directors.  
In Shepherds Investments Ltd. v Walters132 for example, the question of 
whether a senior manager “sales director”—who was not appointed as a 
director and played no role in the exercise of board power and attended no 
board meetings, even in an informal capacity133—was subject to fiduciary 
restraint was treated by the court as a function of whether he could be deemed 
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to be a “de facto director”,134 which the court concluded he was.135 That is, the 
inability of the court to see the actual managerial fiduciary relationship 
generated the strange conclusion that a person who had never attended a 
board meeting should be treated as a director.  Similarly, in Re Mumtaz Properties 
Ltd the question of whether a manager had breached his fiduciary duty was 
treated as dependent on whether he was a de facto director, resulting in the 
court when making this determination focusing on facts that had nothing to do 
with actual exercise of board power—which the court accepted he had not 
exercised136—and which were associated with his managerial role (such as 
having a corporate credit card).  In concluding that the High Court was correct 
in finding that the defendant was a de facto director, the Court of Appeal 
observed that “he was one of the nerve centres from which the activities of the 
company radiated”.137 But from a fiduciary perspective, there are several nerve 
centres in a corporation and they are distinct. Managerial activities and 
undertakings are distinct from directorial activities and undertakings, and 
managerial activities cannot therefore be relevant to the determination of 
whether a person has in fact undertaken and been empowered to perform a 
directorial role. These courts find themselves pushed into this corner because 
they think that the only way of holding the manager accountable as a fiduciary 
is to hold that he is a de facto director.  But attention to traditional fiduciary 
principles shows us that this view is incorrect. In both these cases a strong 
argument could be made that the defendants were managerial fiduciaries and as 
such liable for breach of duty.  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION: BACK TO FIDUCIARY BASICS 
 
It is a basic fact of fiduciary relations that the same person can perform several 
fiduciary roles in relation to another person, such as trustee, guardian or agent. 
And it is self-evident that the undertaking given by the fiduciary in relation to 
each of those roles is separate and distinct and, in each case, is separately, 
subject to the general duties. Necessarily, to understand the nature of each 
relationship and the extent of the fiduciary’s obligations in relation to each of 
her personas, we need to identify the nature and scope of the undertaking. And 
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in relation to each of those personas it would strike us absurd to suggest that 
the undertaking given in relation to one of those personas would affect or 
could be incorporated into another persona. It would be as legally silly as it 
would be to suggest that a fiduciary undertaking given by one real person 
would affect, or be incorporated into, the undertaking given by another real 
person. Nevertheless, this is precisely what has happened in UK company law: 
it has developed a fiduciary-persona myopia resulting in the category and status 
of director incorporating the separate fiduciary persona of the managerial 
fiduciary. The effects, as detailed in the article, have been ruinous, including: 
the imposition of broad, prescriptive obligations on all directors wholly 
detached from their board focused role; an incoherent position on directorial 
competition; an expansive anti-directorial transformation of the no-conflict 
rule; and the puzzling imposition of de facto director status on senior 
managers who have no involvement with the board.        
The way out of this predicament is straightforward. Corporate fiduciary 
law must reconnect to these basic fiduciary facts and recognise that senior 
managers who are also directors provide separate and distinct representative 
undertakings, both of which are regulated separately by the general duties. 
Doing so will then allow courts to see and consider the distinctive nature of 
the directorial undertaking— to determine its “scope and ambit”138—and to 
understand that for a director, whether or not she is also a senior manager, this 
directorial undertaking is a limited undertaking, whose board-focused 
parameters are encoded in companies’ articles of association and reflected in 
the Corporate Governance Code. Seen through this lens, the directorial 
competition permission is not aberrational but sensical and consistent with 
fiduciary law (if in practice often difficult to navigate), the expansive conflicts 
of interests’ prohibition in section 175 must be read down in accordance with 
the conflict of interest and duty body of precedent on which it rests, and there 
is no need to force the square peg of senior managers into the round hole of 
the de facto director.   
This approach to directors’ duties necessarily results, for directors, in a 
less demanding and accountability-focused body of law. Pursuant to this 
approach the status of directors does not result in the imposition of a positive 
duty to further the corporate interest both within and outside of the 
boardroom; competitive directorships become possible and not fanciful; and 
opportunities can be taken by a director that would be of interest to the 
company.  Individuals who perform only the role of directors would indeed be 
                                                          
138 See text to note 4. 
34 
 
relieved by this return to fiduciary law basics; relief that is justified by the most 
basic of common law principles: individuals should be held to account for 
what they agreed to do. There is a duplicity in the law as it currently stands. 
Whilst regulation and the model articles offer a limited, board focused 
understanding of the directorial role—that also likely reflects how the parties 
often explain and understand the role when a person is invited to become a 
board nominee—the common law is much more demanding.   
For many, however, notwithstanding these observations, this 
accountability deficit will be of grave concern. It is submitted that it should not 
be. When we pay due regard to the core fiduciary observation that one person 
can have multiple and separate fiduciary personas then this accountability 
deficit substantially evaporates.  In nearly all of the cases considered in this 
article, under this approach the defendants who were held to be liable and in 
breach of duty would remain so.  Full-time senior managers to whom power is 
delegated to manage and operationally control the company are, whether or 
not they are also directors, managerial fiduciaries.  Their managerial 
undertaking is a full-time positive undertaking to pursue the corporate purpose 
and interest; an undertaking subject to the common law requirements to 
perform it in subjective good faith to further that purpose and those interests; 
a positive duty that cannot be brought into conflict with the manager’s 
personal financial interests without board139 authorisation—a duty that is 
congruent with an alternative presentation that the manager’s personal interests 
cannot be brought into conflict with the company’s interests.  
 Given the codification of the general duties of directors this does 
create some variation in the wording, but not the substantive effect, of the 
general duties for directors—who are subject to the Act’s codified duties—and 
management fiduciaries who are not. For example, a director must perform her 
undertaking in good faith to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of the members; a management fiduciary must perform her 
undertaking in good faith to further the corporate interest.  This is an 
unfortunate consequence of a codification built on a body of case law subject 
to the flaws outlined in this article. This is something we should learn to live 
with in the interests of a more coherent, determinate and fair body of law 
regulating directorial and managerial behaviour.  
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